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UINCONTROLLED EXPANSION IN THE LIGHT
AND POW"ER INDUSTRY
RICHARD JOYCE SMITHt
IT has been characteristic of public utility regulation in the United
States to defer governmental interference with private management
until abuses have become too flagrant to be ignored. Statutory
control as established by Min v. Illfzois 1 came only after reckless
rate practices of railroads had goaded shippers of the middlewest
into disorderly political agitation.2 Subsequent extensions of govern-
mental authority have followed in the wake of newly discovered
abuses. Improvident capitalization endangering the interests of
consumers and investors has led to the supervision of security issues.3
Inadequate, if not misleading, corporate records have resulted in the
prescription of uniform systems of accounting.- And the recently
disclosed malpractices of holding companies have at last demonstrated
the necessity for restraints upon intercorporate affiliations.5
One disadvantage of this theory of regulation is that the statutory
amendments or changes in administrative routine required to control
-Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. See the author's The Judicial
Interpretation of Public Utility Franchises (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 957.
1. 94 U. S. 113 (1877).
2. See BucK, THE AGRARIAN CRUSADE (1920).
3. Webster Manufacturing Company v. Byrnes, 207 Cal. 630, 280 Pac. 101
(1929); Public Service Commission v. Consolidated Gas Co., 148 Md. 90, 129
Atl. 22 (1925); Public Service Commission v. State, 184 Ind. 273, 111 N. E. 10
(1916); Wisconsin Hydro-Electric Company v. Railroad Commission, 236 N. W.
663 (Wis. 1931).
4. State v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 115 Kan. 3, 221
Pac. 259 (1924); m0SHER AND CRAwFoRD, PUBLIC UTILrry REGULATION (1933)
c. 10.
5. Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 941; Note (1933) 46 HLv. L. REv. 508;
Lilienthal, Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utility Regulation (1931)
31 CoL. L. Rzv. 189.
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a new situation are seldom made as soon as the need arises. Even
after an abuse in private management has been uncovered there is
usually an interlude during which the challenged practice continues
to have free play. But a more fundamental disadvantage is that
the prevailing policy implies an abdication of government from
any part in the initial development of public utility industries. Much
attention has been devoted to the punitive side of utility regulation,
but little provision has been made for the cooperation of public
agencies and private managers in the interest of an orderly expansion
from the outset of a particular industrial development.
This absence of governmental initiative may be of little sig-
nificance where the industry involved has already reached a natural
state of disintegration, as seems to be the case with street railroads.
But it has serious consequences where the industry in question is
undergoing rapid technological transformations or is entering upon
a period of widespread territorial expansion. It requires no citation
to point out that the irrational growth of railroad systems prompted
entirely by the profit-making motives of competing entrepreneurs
has been detrimental not only to 'the investors of capital and the
shippers of goods but also to the country as a whole. Nor is it
necessary to enter upon a detailed analysis to demonstrate that
the revolutionary extensions of governmental control over the rail-
roads- contained in the Transportation Act of 1920 1 and the drastic
legislation now proposed 7 to bring order out of chaos, are measures
that come too late to prevbnt the harm caused by uncontrolled ex-
pansion. Whether any degree of public dictatorship will succeed
in salvaging the railroads from the disasters that reckless private
management has prepared for them remains to be determined by
the outcome of the experiments upon which the national government
is about to embark. Nevertheless the plight of that industry may
serve as a warning to legislatures and administrative agencies in
whose hands rests the authority to direct the development of other
public utilities.
It is particularly timely in this connection to consider how far
and along what lines governmental agencies should assume directive
control over the expansion of the electric light and power industry.
Technological developments in that field have already rendered the
consolidation of small, individual plants economically desirable. On
the other hand, competing groups of entrepreneurs have been alert
6. Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Ry., 270 U. S. 266
(1925) ; Texas and New Orleans Ry. v. Northside Belt Ry., 276 U. S. 475 (1928);
Note (1926) 39 THARv. L. Rv. 753.
7. See 8 U. S. Daily 135 (April 29-May 6, 1933).
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to recognize the possibilities of such consolidations and through far
flung financial manipulations supplemented in part by actual inter-
connections have created a series of so-called systems which sweep
indiscriminately across the country." The collapse of the Middle
West Utilities Company 9 together with numerous other examples 10
of the detrimental effect of holding companies upon the efficiency
and stability of operating units will be sufficient to insure adequate
regulation of the financial phases of the industry. Here all that is
required is the prevention of speculative manipulations and the
extension of control over rates to include all transactions among the
various constituents of intercorporate affiliations. If such control
eliminates the pyramiding of profits and to that extent destroys the
raison d'etre of holding company systems, the electric light and
power industry as such need not suffer. There may be ultimate loss
to investors, the responsibility for which must be borne alike by the
private interests that promoted and the governments that failed to
prevent the schemes, but a sound and rational development of the
industry need not be impeded.
Danger to a proper development of the industry does lie, however,
in the lack of governmental supervision over physical or territorial
expansion of the numerous private systems operating in the field.
While the holding company has been primarily a device for financial
control, it has to some extent promoted physical interconnections."
A large number of the projects licensed by the Federal Power Com-
mission have been shown to be controlled by holding company
systems,' 2 and the investigations of the Federal Trade Commission
have already disclosed that intercorporate affiliations in the light
and power industry have usually been attended by physical inter-
connections. The American Gas and Electric System has high ten-
sion transmission lines extending from northern Indiana through
S. BONrRIGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COATPA14Y (1932). See also special
report of Federal Power Commission, Holding Cbmpany Control of Licensces
of Federal Power Commission, (1932), and transcript of the proceedings of the
Federal Trade Commission under Sen. Res. 83, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927).
9. Danielson, From Insdll to Injry (1933) 151 ATL. o. 497.
10. Note 6, supra. See also Re Alabama Power Co., P. U. R. 1932E, 323
(Ala. P. S. C. 1932); Re New Hampshire Gas and Electric Co., P. U. R. 1931D,
225 (N. H. P. S. C. 1931); Re New York State Electric and Gas Corp., P. U. R.
1932E, 1 (N. Y. P. S. C. 1932); Re Green Mountain Power Corp., P. U. R.
1932A, 130 (Vt. P. S. C. 1931); Re Arizona Edison Co., P. U. R. 1932A, 238
(Ariz. C. C. 1931).
11. Field, Holding Corporation Control as a Provkional Form of Consoli-
dation (1932) 8 Jou. LAND AND PUB. UTIL. EcoN. 87.
12. Federal Power Commission, Holding Company Control of Licensees
(1932) x-x.
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Ohio and West Virginia to sections in Tennessee and Virginia.
0
Power systems supervised by the Electric Bond and Share Company
have been established on comprehensive scales in nineteen different
states. 14 Other systems whose development has been attended by
territorial as well as financial consolidation are the Georgia Power
Company,15 the Alabama Power Company, 16 the New England
Power Association,1 7 the North American System,18 and the Middle
West Utilities System.'0 But territorial expansion in the light and
power field has not been confined to the growth of particular holding
company systems. The interconnection under private auspices of
"all the important power resources in the northeastern section of
the United States" has recently been announced. 2 The network is
described as the fruits of twelve years of negotiation and construc-
tion, and involves interconnections not only among five holding
company groups but also among a large number of independent
operating companies.
21
Governmental agencies have thus far exercised little control over
this widespread movement toward the consolidation and inter-
connection of power territories. In keeping with the prevailing
policy to regulate only against abuses, control of the light and power
industry, like that of other utilities, has been primarily devoted to
the protection of consumers from excessive rates or inadequate
service,22 and has been deemed to be the function for the most part
of agencies of the state governments.23  Such agencies have in the
13. Federal Trade Commission, Letter to United States Senate on Utility
Corporations, no. 22, p. 635 et seq.
14. Ibid, nos. 23-24, p. 403 et seq. (See Map facing p. 418. It is to be noted
that the Electric Bond and Share System is composed of a series of intermediate
holding companies each operating in its own section of the country. The policy
of the Electric Bond and Share system is to interconnect its local plants in
each state (see p. 409)).
15. Ibid. no. 28.
16. Ibid. no. 30.
17. Ibid. nos. 31 and 32.
18. Ibid. nos. 33 and 34.
19. Ibid. no. 38. The Federal Trade Commission has also held hearings on
the activities of smaller systems and is still making investigations under Son.
Res. 83 and 126, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927, 1928).
20. N. Y. Times, May 7, 1933, Financial Section, at 7.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Graver v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 126 App. Div. 371, 110
N. Y. Supp. 603 (2d Dep't 1908); Andrews v. North River Light and Power
Co., 24 Misc. 671, 53 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1898).
23. "The Public Service Commission was established for the purpose of
regulating corporations who rendered service to the public for which they
were entitled to charge, that they might be required to render adequate service
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past exercised some incidental control over territorial expansion.
At the outset there was a tendency to consider the industry merely
as one for the distribution of lighting energy 2- within the confines
of local communities, and, indeed, it was thought that the major
function of the industry would be to supplant gas as a method of
street lighting.25 For that reason the earliest form of public control
over physical extensions was by means of municipal ordinances
or franchises. G The purpose of the control thus authorized was
variously expressed as the supervision of street wiring,- the main-
tenance of the streets in a safe condition 28 or the general regulation
of the highways.29 While municipalities purported through the ex-
ercise of this control over streets to regulate the number of enter-
prises within its limits to the end that there would be neither exclusive
monopolies nor unrestrained competition, 0 little consideration was
given to the necessity for public direction in the expansion of the
industry. It was assumed that each enterprise terminated with
muncipal boundaries, and the chief concern in the granting of a
franchise became control over rates.31
Although most of the regulatory authority of the state has now
been transferred to a centralized agency of the legislature, the
for a reasonable compensation." City of New York v. Prendergast, 202 App.
Div. 308, 313, 314, 195 N. Y. Supp. 815, 819 (1st Dep't 1922).
24. See Scranton Electric Light and Heat Company's Appeal, 122 Pa. 154,
15 Atl. 446 (1888).
25. Gas Co. v. City of Davenport, 124 Iowa 22, 98 N. W. 892 (1904).
26. Attorney General v. Walworth Light and Power Co., 157 Blass. 86, 31
N. E. 482 (1892); Edison Co. v. Hooper, 85 Md. 110, 36 Atl. 113 (1897).
27. Note 26, supra. See also, Norwalk Electric Light Co. v. Common
Council, 71 Conn. 381, 42 Atl. 82 (1899).
28. Citizens Electric Light and Power Co. v. Sands, 95 Mich. 551, 55 N. W.
452 (1893).
29. La Clede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 170 U. S. 78 (1898); overdale
v. Edwards, 155 Ind. 374, 58 N. E. 495 (1900); Purnell v. McLane, 98 Md.
590, 56 Atl. 830 (1904).
30. Rutland Electric Light Co. v. Marble City Electric Light Co., 65 Vt.
377, 26 Atl. 635 (1893); Edison Electric Light and Power Co. v. Merchants
Electric Light, Heat and Power Co., 200 Pa. 209, 49 Atl. 760 (1901); People's
Electric Light and Power Co. v. Capital Gas and Electric Light Co., 116 Ky.
76, 75 S. W. 280 (1903).
31. Ex parte Goodrich, 160 Cal. 410, 117 Pac. 451 (1911); Pinney and
Boyle Co. v. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp., 168 Cal. 12, 141 Pac. 620
(1914). See also Smith, Judicial Interpretation of Public Utility Fra-chises
(1930) 39 YALE L. J. 957. In this respect municipal regulation was supported
by the common law rules as to rates and service requirements of common call-
ings. Railway Co. v. Village of Bowling Green, 57 Ohio St. 336, 49 N. E.
121 (1897); Snell v. Clinton Electric Light Co., 196 M11. 626, 63 N. E. 10S2
(1902); Gainesville v. Gainesville Gas and Electric Power Co., 65 Fla. 404,
62 So. 919 (1913).
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municipality still reserves the right in many jurisdictions to de-
termine when a private plant shall operate within its boundaries."
The development of a large statewide or regional system may, there-
fore, still be dependent upon the consent of a series of unrelated
municipalities. 33 This stipulation for municipal consent is, however,
less inimical to a rational expansion of industry than municipal ac-
quisition of private electric plants as it is authorized in some states.
Some years ago the City of Indianapolis resisted the sale of a number
of small operating plants to a large corporation which was engaged
in consolidating operating territories in Indiana. The Public Service
Commission granted a certificate approving the sale on the basis of
the economies that would result. In a suit for an injunction brought
by the City, the commission's order was upheld, but the court de-
clared that under the statutes there remained in the city the authority
to purchase that portion of the proposed system which was to operate
within the city's boundaries. 4 In other words, a consolidation of
territories, the economies of which had been recognized by the central-
ized governmental agency, was immediately threatened with disrup-
tion by the action of a single political subdivision.
Similar incursions upon private systems have already been made
in other states. The City of Puyallup, Washington, several years
ago elected to purchase part of the Puget Sound Power and Light
System operating within the city's limits. In the condemnation pro-
ceedings which followed, much was argued on the amount of severance
damages to be allowed the Company for the loss of its Puyallup unit."
But there is no indication that the court realized that the very exis-
32. South Shore Utility Co. v. Railroad Commission, 207 Wis. 95, 240 N. W.
784 (1932); De Queen Light and Power Co. v. Curtis, 157 Ark. 238, 248 S. NV.
5 -(1923); People v. Public Service Commission, 255 N. Y. 232, 174 N. E. 637
(1931). A city has thus been permitted to enjoin the entrance of a single
wire within its boundaries, Town of Ackley v. Central States Electric Co.,
204 Iowa 1246, 214 N. W. 879 (1927), and to make its franchise a condition
precedent to the transmission of energy from another city to its own bound-
aries. State v. Electric Power Co., 116 Kan. 70, 226 Pac. 254 (1924). On
the other hand, some courts insist upon the timely assertion of the city'-
authority as against a plant already established within its boundaries, State
v. Missouri Utility, 53 S. W. (2d) 394 (Mo. 1932).
33. See N. Y. Times, April 13, 1933, at 25, where the decision of the
Yonkers City Council to permit stretching high tension wires along one of
its streets is reported as insuring the completion of interconnection of upstate
New York hydro-electric systems with the steam plants of the metropolitan
area of New York City. Contra: Parker Young Co. v. State, 83 N. 11. 551,
145 AtI. 786 (1929).
34. Public Service Commission v. City of Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37, 137
N. E. 705 (1922).
35. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. v. City of Puyallup, 51 F. (2d)
688 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 421158
HeinOnline  -- 42 Yale L. J. 1158 1932-1933
UNCONTROLLED UTILITY EXPANSION
tence of severance damages is an argument against municipal pur-
chase. A similar procedure has also been followed by municipalities
in California. As early as 1916 the City of Los Angeles exercised its
authority by appeal to the Railroad Commission to purchase a part
of the Southern California Edison system. Here, again, the com-
mission exhaustively treated questions of purchase price and damages
caused by severance without noting the retrogressive effect of muni-
cipal purchase upon the long run expansion of the industry. G Thus
it is that in a similar case in Wisconsin the Railroad Commission could
require just compensation to the company from a municipality seeldng
to acquire the franchise and recognize that "if the city acquires the
right to sell directly to the consuming public . . it has taken
something of value from the respondent," 37 but fail to realize that
a factor in the loss to the particular company might be the impair-
ment of future light and power facilities in the state as a whole.09
Another phase of municipal regulation which may deter an orderly
expansion of the industry is the operation of city plants in competition
with private systems. Where a municipality merely acquires an
existing plant it may be possible by agreement to maintain connections
with the main system in the territory so that the economies of con-
solidation need not be lost. But there would seem to be little justi-
fication in the long run for the erection of a municipal plant to
compete with a private plant in the same locality. It has been held,
however, that a city may in the absence of an express agreement to
the contrary resort to such an expensive method of enforcing rate
reductions 39 and that the effect on the existing plant is immaterial,.4
36. Re Los Angeles, P. U. R. 1916F, 593 (Cal. R. C. 1916). See also Re
Los Angeles, P. U. R. 1929C, 389 (Cal. R. C. 1929), involving valuation of
municipal acquisition of additional parts of the Southern California Edison
System in territory which had been annexed to the City of Los Angeles. See
also Re City of Redding, P. U. R. 1919F, 415 (Cal. R. C. 1919); Re City of
Oroville, P. U. R. 1922E, 451 (Cal. R. C. 1922).
37. City of Neenah v. Wisconsin Traction, Light, Heat and Power Co.,
P. U. R. 1915A, 372, 376 (Wis. R. C. 1915).
38. For other instances of municipal acquisition of light and power plants
see Re Falls Light and Power Co., P. U. R. 1916D, 151 (Wis. R. C. 1916);
Sparta v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light and Power Co., P. U. R. 1925E, 315
(Wis. R. C. 1925); Re Village of Stratford, P. U. R. 1925E, 328 (Wis. R. C.
1925); Re Borough of Reynoldsville, P. U. R. 1918B, 464 (Pa. P. S. C. 1918);
San Francisco v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., P. U. R. 1929E, 529 (Cal. R. C.
1929); Blair v. Northern State Power Co., P. U. R. 1931A, 90 (Wis. R. C.
1931).
39. Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co., 191 U. S. 50 (1903). See
Note (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 116.
40. People v. City of Loveland, 76 Colo. 188, 230 Pac. 399 (1924); Pasa-
-dena v. Railroad Commission, 183 Cal. 526, 192 Pac. 25 (1920); Houma Light-
ing and Ice Co. v. Houma, 127 La. 726, 53 So. 970 (1911).
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although, of course, the municipal plant must not actually "interfere"
with the exercise of a valid and subsisting franchise.41 In some
jurisdictions the erection of a municipal plant to compete with a
private system is made dependent upon approval by the state com-
mission.4 2 But even in such cases, approval is often frankly granted
for the mere purpose of keeping rates at a low level.43 Once the
competition begins, the question becomes almost solely one of rates,
raising such issues as the power of the city to require private plants
to maintain high rate levels and thus aid the development of the
municipal plant,44 the right of the company to require the municipal
plant to charge no less than cost,46 and other points of conflicting
interests.46 Seldom, however, is the situation solved by a voluntary
transfer of the properties of one to the other.
47
From the beginning, municipal control, whether by franchise to
private interests, subsequent recapture, or actual competition, has
been maintained primarily to enforce low rates for city inhabitants.
It may seriously be questioned whether even the rate problem should
be defined in terms of political subdivisions.48 But it is certain that
the territorial and physical developments of the light and power in-
41. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp., 251 U. S. 32, 76
(1919); Bell v. David City, 94 Neb. 157, 142 N. W. 523 (1913).
42. Wisconsin Traction, Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Menasha, 157 Wis.
1, 145 N. W. 231 (1914).
43. West v. Byron, 153 Md. 464, 138 Atl. 404 (1927).
44. Texas Electric Service Co. v. City of Seymour, 54 F. (2d) 97 (N. D.
Tex. 1931) (power denied); Town of Mapleton v. Iowa Public Service Co.,
209 Iowa 400, 223 N. W. 476 (1929) (power granted).
45. In Re Niagara, Lockport and Ontario Power Co., 229 App. Div. 295,
241 N. Y. Supp. 162 (3d Dep't 1930).
46. It has been held that where a large private system reduces rates in a
city to meet municipal competition, it can be required to show cause why
similar reduction should not be made throughout its entire territory. Georgia
Public Service Commission v. Georgia Power Co., 172 Ga. 71, 157 S. E. 98
(1931). A city may under special statutory language sell power beyond its
boundaries, Yamhill Electric Co. v. City of McMinnville, 130 Ore. 309, 274
Pac. 118 (1929). Contra: City of Loveland v. Public Utilities Commission,
87 Colo. 556, 289 Pac. 1090 (1930).
47. Re Niagara Lockport and Ontario Power Co., P. U. R. 1932A, 92 (N. Y.
P. S. C. 1932). For statistics on the flux of ownership see DORAN, CHANGING
CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP IN THE ELECTRIC LIGHT
AND POWER INDUSTRY (1929).
48. Cf. Wabash Valley Electric Co. v. Young, 53 Sup. Ct. 234 (1933),
where valuation of city property of a system apart from that of the entire
system for rate making purposes was sustained. Such a decision fails to
recognize (a) that city boundaries have as a matter of fact been transcended
by industrial developments and (b) that consumers in densely populated areas
should share the cost of maintaining service in sparsely settled districts. See
Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 912.
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dustry are no longer determined in fact by the boundaries of cities,
towns and villages. Where private companies have extended beyond
those boundaries, their systems should not be harassed by a continu-
ation of archaic municipal regulations. It should be noted, however,
that criticism of municipal interference with territorial expansion
implies neither that private systems have been properly extended,
nor that ultimate public operation is unsound. Such criticism does
imply, however, that in extending their systems beyond city limits
private companies have responded to the natural growth of the in-
dustry and that public operation is entitled to be considered only
when it makes a similar response.
The influence of municipal regulation upon the territorial expansion
of the industry has, therefore, been entirely negative. It remains
to be considered whether the centralized agencies of state govern-
ments in which an increasing amount of control has been reposed
have been able to exercise any degree of positive influence on this
phase of the industry's development. The most direct authority ex-
ercised by these state agencies for the control of expansion in the
light and power industry is to be found in the administration of
certificates of public necessity and convenience. In a majority of states
it is now provided that no private utility shall enter new territory,
make new plant additions or otherwise enlarge, alter or diminish
its enterprise without having first obtained a certificate of approval
from the appointed regulatory agency of the state.4 9 As in the case
of municipal control, however, this function of state commissions has
been justified as a means for controlling rates and service.P In the
49. All states require such certificates for territorial extensions of electric
utilities except Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wyoming. West Virginia requires certification
only of water power developments.
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider in detail the rules governing
the granting of certificates. The purpose here is merely to appraise the
administration of this phase of commission authority in its effect upon a ration-
alization of the light and power industry. For general discussions see Hall,
Certiftcates of Public Necessity and Convenicnwe (1929-1930) 28 MIcH. L. Rnv.
107, 276; MosHER AND CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1933) c. 8.
50. Said the Supreme Court of Idaho, upholding the constitutionality of
certification: "It is too late to question the power of the legislature to regulate
public utilities respecting rates, service, etc. That power presupposes intel-
ligent regulation and necessarily carries with it the power to employ the
means necessary and proper for such intelligent regulation." Idaho Light
and Power Co. v. Bloomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 254, 141 Pac. 1083, 1093 (1914).
The court in that case found that the elimination of destructive competition
was a necessary means for rate regulation. See also Pire v. Commission,
72 Colo. 67, 209 Pac. 640 (1922); State v. Atkinson, 275 Mo. 325, 204 S. W.
11611933]
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furtherance of this policy courts have refused in most cases to in-
terfere with the judgment of the commission in granting or with-
-holding a particular certificate. This has been true, even though the
commission disagrees -with the municipality on the reasonableness of
the rates of the,-existing utility,'; or grants a certificate to a new
company on the, ground: that the existing utility is giving inadequate
service.5 2
jBut in the exercise of this authority commissions have failed to
-indicate a uniform policy. Immediate considerations have often been
-as influential -as programs for future developments. Thus, a com-
mission on one occasion may be sustained in dividing the territory
ofl asingle borough between two companies, 3 while in another jurs
diction- there-may be approval of the activities of consolidation on
the part of a large. system seeking autonomous operation in an in-
creasing territory, even though other smaller companies are left by
the wayside.5 4 One commission has been reversed for granting to
the small subsidiary of a coal company a certificate enabling it to tap
the territory held by a large system;55 while another commission has
successfully restrained the erection of a six mile extension of the
transmission line of one of the largest systems in the jurisdiction. 0
In spite of this lack of uniformity, however, some commissions have
consistently looked with favor upon territorial expansion, but their
attitude has been expressed rather through approval of privately
initiated ,consolidations and extensions than by their own affirmative
acts. At an early date consolidations effected by private companies
897 (1918); Oneonta Light and Power Co. v. Commission, 180 App. Div. 32,
167 N. Y. Supp. 486 (3d Dep't 1917).
51. Jenkins Township v. Commission, 65 Pa. Sup. Ct. 122 (1916); Relief
Electric Light Company's -Petition, 63 Pa. Sup. Ct. 1 (1916).
52. Fogelsville Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 271 Pa.
237, 114 At.-822 (1921).
53. Eastern New Jersey Power Co. v. Board of Public Utilities Commis-
sioners, 6 N. J. Misc. 118, 140 Atl. 258 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
54. Coverdale Electric Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 68 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 1351 (1917). See also Harmony- Electric Co. v. Commission, 80 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 46 (1922), where one system was authorized to extend its service to the
generation of energy'by steam ,as well as by water in the interests of con-
solidation. In that case' the !court ',was ready to sustain the commission's
endorsement of voluntary- consolidation by a large number of companies because
the mergers had begun prior- to the effective date of the Public Service Com-
mission Act. See ,Harmony Electric Co. v. Commission, 275 Pa. 242, 119
Atl. 712 (1923).
; 55. Illinois TPowervand Light Corp., v. Commerce Commission, 320 Ill, 427,
151N. E.;236 (1926).
: :56. Public,Service Commission v. Kansas City Power ,and Light Co., 825
io. 1217, '31 S. W.. (2d) 167 (1930). See also Kansas Gas and Electric Co.
v. Public, Service .Commission, 124 Kan. 690, 261 Pac. 592 (1927).
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-within particular municipalities were recognized as a move in the
right direction. 57 Indeed, there are instances in which courts and
commissions have looked upon territorial development under private
auspices as the proper method of expansion. S As recently as 1929
the New Hampshire Commission declared that "Utilities should not
be deprived from doing as they see fit with their properties, provided
their acts are not illegal or harmful to the public." 0 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in approving the merger of a light
and power distributing company with a hydroelectric generating
company, gave as its reason the prevention of economic waste and
the possibility of more efficient service at reduced rates, concluding
that "These considerations make the consolidation or merger of these
plants a matter of public policy, which should be accelerated by a
liberal construction of the acts empowering merger or purchase." c"
But where two or more private systems are competing for cer-
tificates to permit extensions into the same territory, a commission is
often compelled to abandon this passive attitude. In 1930 the River
Falls Power Company petitioned the Alabama Commission for au-
thority to construct and operate a transmission line in furtherance
of its program to develop interconnections among the various oper-
ating units of its system. The Alabama Power Company intervened
to urge that the petition be denied in view of the fact that it already
had under construction a transmission line which could serve the
territory more economically than the petitioner's line. The commis-
sion, although persuaded by the facts presented through the inter-
vention, found that it was without authority to order the petitioner's
operating units to purchase power from the Alabama Power line.
It therefore granted the petition but stipulated that the rates charged
in the territory should be as low as would have been possible if energy
had been purchased from the intervener. The commission also
pointed to the necessity for additional authority to accomplish by
direct order the control over territorial development which it was
forced to attempt to exert by indirection."' Other commissions faced
57. Idaho Light and Power Co. v. Bloomquist, supra note 50; Saginaw
Power Co. v. City of Saginaw, 193 Fed. 1008 (E. D. Mich. 1911).
58. Weld v. Board of Commissioners, 197 Blass. 556, 84 N. E. 101 (1908).
59. Re Franklin Light and Power Co., P. U. R. 1929D, 678, 679 (N. H.
P. S. C. 1929). Accord: Re Ashland Electric Light and Power Co., P. U. R.
1929B,'326 (Me. P. S. C. 1929).
60. York Haven Co. v. Commission, 287 Pa. 241, 245, 134 Atl. 419, 420
(1926).
61. Re River Falls Power Co., P. U. R. 1930E, 97, 103 (Ala. P. S. C. 1931).
"It is the view of the Commission that the legislature of Alabama should
clothe the Commission with definite and certain authority to deal with all
public utilities rendering the same or similar service to the people of Alabama,
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with similar controversies have exhibited varying degrees of attention
to the broader issues. Thus, as between two petitions for certificates
to construct hydrodams, one by a large private power system, the
other by the subsidiary of an electro-chemical industry, the Tennessee
Commission has favored the latter on the ground that it would bring
a new industry into the territory. 2 Normally, however, when faced
with petitions from two utilities, a commission will consider "whether
or not the extension to the new territory to be served logically and
geographically falls in the territory of one company or the other." 03
Hence, while a pre-existing franchise in another company has been
held to be no bar to the entry of a large system, whose program called
for the development of a wide area of supply, 4 it has also been stated
as the basis for a decision on competing petitions, "It is the opinion
of the Commission that one utility should not attempt to pierce an
open space that may exist in the territory surrounded by another
utility, but that the utility should keep before it the fact that wherever
it is possible to block out territory with the view of eventually serving
the territory with a system approaching a network effect, will be
[sic] more in the interest of the public than to build an extension
into a territory which opens but very little opportunity to build it
into a network system that can be supplied from more than one
source." 65
Despite, however, these instances of competition among private
systems for new territory, it is to be expected that the problem of
control in the future will be that raised by the voluntary coordination
of private systems as indicated by the recently completed intercon-
so as to provide the state as a whole with service of the best and most eco-
nomical nature. To make it plain, it is our view that the Commission should
have the clear authority to require utilities to buy, sell, and exchange their
commodities and service so that the state can prevent burdening the people with
unnecessary capital investment in the duplication of lines and systems, and
with the unnecessary duplication of overhead operating costs which enter into
these operations."
62. Re Tennessee Eastern Power Co., P. U. R. 1929E, 175 (Tenn. R. & P.
U. C. 1929). Cf. Re Fox & Putnam v. Parker Young Co., P. U. R. 1929E,
403 (N. H. P. S. C. 1929), where preference was given to an electric utility
as against a manufacturing company.
63. Re Ozark Utilities Co., P. U. R. 1929D, 592, 599 (Mo. P. S. C. 1929).
64. Re Central Maine Power Co., P. U. R. 1932C, 157 (Me. P. U. C. 1932).
65. Re Kansas City Power and Light Co., P. U. R. 1931A, 463, 466 (Mo.
P. S. C. 1931). So also it has been held that the transfer of transmission
lines to a large private system rather than to a municipal generating system
from which the transmission company had been purchasing its energy would
insure a more economical development of the territory. Ottawa v. Public
Service Commission, 130 Kan. 867, 288 Pac. 556 (1930).
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nections in the northeastern states. 0 A phase of this particular
scheme came before the Public Service Commission of New York in
1932, under a petition by the New York Light and Power Company
for certification of a main transmission line from the northern bound-
ary of Westchester County to Albany County. 7 The purpose of the
line, as stated in the petition and established at the hearings, was to
connect the steam generation system of the metropolitan area of New
York City with the hydroelectric sources of the Niagara Hudson
upstate system. After close scrutiny of the financial aspects of the
proposition, the commission stated that the tranmission line "seems
to be in the public interest, in that it will reduce the cost of generating
and distributing electric energy to the consumers of the New York
Power and Light Corporation and of the electric companies in Greater
New York and Westchester County... "Is It was also recognized
that the line was to form an integral part of an interstate scheme,
and that ultimately it might interfere with the utilization of St.
Lawrence power under a program to be developed by the Power
Authority of the State of New York. The commission did not pre-
sume to pass upon the soundness of the entire interstate scheme, but
it did grant a certificate subject in part to future action of the New
York Power Authority.
Such cases as the New York Commission's order on the petition
of the New York Power and Light corporation 09 and the Alabama
Commission's decision in Re River Falls Power Company 70 represent,
however, exceptions to the typical attitude in granting a certificate.
Even ii those cases there continues to be an implied reliance upon
the initiative of private management to make proposals for con-
solidation. But in the normal case, the proposals themselves are
seldom scrutinized.71 This is especially true where the question con-
cerns merely a corporate consolidation or merger.72 It is also to be
66. Note 20, supra.
67. Re New York Power and Light Corp., P. U. R. 1932A, 357 (N. Y. P.
S. C. 1932).
68. Id. at 366.
69. Note 67, supra.
70. Note 61, supra.
71. See Re St. Louis Public Service Co., P. U. R. 1932C, 161 (Mo. P. S. C.
1932). Some commissions still conceive their function to be merely to ascer-
tain the true cost of the extensions. [Re Wisconsin Power and Light Co.,
P. U. R. 1931C, 289 (Wis. R. C. 1931); Re Niagara Hudson Power Corp.,
P. U. R. 1932C, 486 (N. Y. P. S. C. 1932)]; while others are solely concerned
-with the immediate effect upon rates. Re Chester Valley Electric Co., P. U. R.
1932A, 227 (Pa. P. S. C. 1932).
72. Re Maryland Light and Power Co., P. U. R. 1930B, 465 (Did. P. S. C.
1930); Re Fall Mountain Electric Co., P. U. R. 1932C, 275 (N. H. P. S. C.
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noted that in a considerable number of states no control at all is
exerted.73 Nor is it definitely settled that all branches of the light
and power industry are subject to the jurisdiction of state commis-
sions. In the absence of federal legislation no certain authority
exists to control the incidents of interstate transmission, 4 while, on
the other hand, the tendency in a number of states to restrict the
exportation of power has a definitely retarding effect upon a rational
expansion of the industry75 Furthermore, jurisdiction of state com-
missions depends upon statutory definitions of companies engaged in
the light and power business and there is a diversity of opinion as
to whether generation and transmission units are "public utilities"
along with those companies which distribute energy to consumers. 0
It is, therefore, evident that under existing methods of regulation
there is little opportunity for governmental direction in the develop-
ment of the light and power industry. While much authority has
already been transferred from municipalities to centralized agencies
of the state,- political subdivisions continue to exert a retarding effect
upon industrial growth through their power to exclude, acquire or
compete with private systems. On the other hand, the state agencies
have been satisfied to let private industry initiate programs of ex-
pansion, and their administration of restraints upon such programs
1932). See Hall, State Control of Consolidation of Public Utilities (1932)
U. or PA. L. REv. 8.
73. Note 49, supra.
74. Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co., 273
U. S. 83 (1927). Cf. Western Distributing Co. v. Kansas Public Service Com-
mission, 285 U. S. 119 (1932).
75. ELSBREE, INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRIC PowER (1931) c. 2;
Simonton, Power of a State to Control Export of H21dro-Elactrio Energy (1932)
39 W. VA. L. Q. 4.
76. The Maine Commission has held that it has no jurisdiction over the
sale of the properties of a generation company. Re International Power Co.,
P. U. R. 1931E, 65 (Me. P. U. C. 1931). See also State v. Power Transmission
Co., 320 Mo. 1146, 9 S. W. (2d) 589 (1928); Chippewa Power Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 188 Wis. 246, 205 N. W. 900 (1925); Benjamin v. Great Northern
Utilities Co., P. U. R. 1924B, 705 (Mont. P. S. C. 1924); Public Service Com-
mission v. Montana Water and Power Co., P. U. R. 1926A, 689 (Mont. P. S. C.
1926). On the other hand, it has been held that for various purposes such
companies are subject to commission control. Salisbury Railway Co. v.
Southern Power Co., 179 N. C. 18, 101 S. E. 593 (1919); Southern Oklahoma
Power Co. v. Corporation Commission, 96 Okla. 53, 220 Pac. 370 (1923); Re
EastSt. Louis Light and Power Co., P. U. R. 1919E, 379 (Ill. P. U. C. 1919).
Intercorporate affiliations have often -been considered the determinant. Re
West Missouri,Power Co.,-P. U. R.'1929A, 61 (Mo.,P. S. C. 1929); Ohio Mining
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 106 Ohio St. 13, 140 N. E. 143 (1922).
Cf.:Bouthern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 110 Ohio St.
246, 143 N. B. ,700 (1924).
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has been neither farsighted nor uniform. There are, furthermore,
strong indications that just as the industry at an early date outgrew
the boundaries of municipalities, it may now be transcending state
lines. There is a fundamental fallacy in the assumption that any
industry can be made to fit the procrustean frameworks of politi-
cally divided territories.
What, then, becomes of the problem of government in this field?
Not the abdication of public responsibility, nor the reliance merely
upon punitive regulation. On this point the plight of the railroads
is convincing. Private management alone is incompetent to ration-
alize industrial expansion. But on the other hand, drastic preemp-
tion of the entire field by governmental ownership would likewise
fail at this time to solve the problem. Revolutions in any degree
involve economic loss that is justified only by the ultimate balance
of benefits. We have gone too far in permitting private development
of the light and power industry to resort at once to nationalizing
processes. The middle road still remains the wisest course.
The program of The New York Power Authority seems to recognize
the possibilities of such a course. Delegated by the state to supervise
along with the national government the development of the St.
Lawrence River as a waterway from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes,
it is also empowered to create out of such development huge sources
of hydro-electric power.77 While much attention must be given the
cost of engineering and other financial aspects of the power project,
the Power Authority has already recognized that fruition of the
project must ultimately depend upon transmission and distribution.
To that end negotiations are to be carried on with private systems.78
Such a program necessarily implies an increase in governmental
initiative in promoting a proper expansion of the industry.
The prospectus of the New York Power Authority may well lead
the way to a coordination of private and public agencies throughout
the country. Particularly, it should influence the development of
federal agencies. Thus far, for instance, the Federal Power Com-
mission 9 has been interested chiefly in the conservation of power
sources on the public domain and in the cost of proposed private
developments, with the end of recapture in view.80 It has awaited
the applications of private systems for power sites instead of utilizing
this public facility as a means for promoting orderly expansion of
77. Power Authority of New York, Second Annual Report (1933) 9.
78. Id. at 50.
79. 41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 793 ct seq. (1926); 4G STAT. 797
(1930), 16 U. S. C. SunP. VI § 792 et scq. (1932).
80. Re Alabama Power Co., P. U. R. 1932D, 345 (Fed. P. C. 1932). See
Comments (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 66, 248.
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the industry. In this respect the passive policy of the Power Com-
mission has not been egregious. It is merely one more indication of
the abdication of governmental agencies from any part in the de-
velopment of this rapidly expanding industry.8'
81. A study necessarily to follow the instant analysis is a consideration of
the means by which under our dual system of government rationalization can
be effected. On this question, see the prophetic exposition of Interstate Com-
pacts by Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution
(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 685.
Another corollary to be presented is the example of the reorganization of
the light and power industry in Great Britain now in process under govern-
mental auspices. See Reports 1-12, Electricity Commissioners, Great Britain;
Reports 1-5, Central Electricity Board, Great Britain.
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